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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order granting Mr. Halseth's 
motion to suppress. The order of the district court should be affirmed because State v. 
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007), has been abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely 569 U.S. _, 
133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Alternatively, if this Court believes that Diaz has not been 
abrogated by McNeely, Mr. Halseth asserts that Diaz should be overruled. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The following facts are taken from the district court's order granting Mr. Halseth's 
motion to suppress: On November 5, 2012, Officer Boni from the Post Falls Police 
Department was dispatched to locate a gray truck with stolen Washington license 
plates. (R., p.119.) Officer Boni was advised that the truck would have a snow blower 
in the back. (R., p.119.) Officer Boni located a vehicle matching this description and 
initiated a felony traffic stop in a parking lot. (R., p.119.) 
After the officer told the driver to stay in the vehicle, the vehicle drove into 
oncoming traffic, striking another car, causing minor damage. (R., p.120.) Officer Boni 
pursued the vehicle; during this pursuit his vehicle was struck by another vehicle. 
(R., p.120.) Officer Boni then discontinued the pursuit. (R., p.120.) 
Shortly thereafter, Officer Boni was advised that the Washington State Patrol had 
taken the driver of the vehicle, Mr. Halseth, into custody. (R., p.120.) Mr. Halseth 
refused to complete voluntary field sobriety tests. (R., p.120.) 
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Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Boni detected a strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage on Mr. Halseth and Mr. Halseth was then transported to Sacred Heart Medical 
Center for evidentiary testing via blood draw. (R., p.121.) Mr. Halseth allegedly stated, 
"you can't take my blood! I refused! How can you take it without permission!" 
(R., p.121.) Despite this alleged refusal, the hospital tech took the blood draw without a 
warrant. (R., p.121.) 
Mr. Halseth was charged with burglary, two counts of grand theft, eluding a 
police officer, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and leaving 
the scene of an accident. (R., p.38.) The DUI was charged as felony due to two prior 
convictions for DUI. (R., p.4D.) One of the grand theft charges was subsequently 
dismissed by the State. (R., p.61.) 
Mr. Halseth filed a motion to suppress and supporting memorandum, asserting 
that the results of an involuntary blood draw be suppressed because the draw violated 
both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
(R., pp.72, 78.) The district court granted the motion to suppress. (R., p.119.) 
The State appealed. (R., p.1S0.) Because the district court was correct that Diaz 
is incompatible with McNeely, the district court's order should be affirmed. However, 
Mr. Halseth also asserts that Diaz was wrong when it was decided and should be 
overruled even if compatible with McNeely. 
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ISSUE 
Has the State failed to show error in the district court's order granting Mr. Halseth's 
motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The State Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Granting 
Mr. Halseth's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Halseth submits that the order of the district court should be affirmed 
because State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007), has been abrogated by Missouri v. 
McNeely 569 U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Alternatively, if this Court believes that 
Diaz has not been abrogated by McNeely, Mr. Halseth asserts that Diaz should be 
overruled. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, this Court defers to the district 
court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous and exercises free review over the 
district court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been 
satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,470 (2001). 
C. The State Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Granting 
Mr. Halseth's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that U[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause." A warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a 
recognized exception. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
That principle applies to the type of search at issue in this case, which involved a 
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compelled physical intrusion beneath Mr. Halseth's skin and into his veins to obtain a 
sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation. "Such an invasion of 
bodily integrity implicates an individual's "most personal and deep-rooted expectations 
of privacy." Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 
489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy 
burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 749-750 (1984); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224,225 (1993). If evidence is not 
seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence 
discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed a blood draw as a 
Fourth Amendment violation. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In 
Schmerber, the petitioner and a companion had been drinking at a bar in a bowling 
alley. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. After the pair left the bowling alley, the car which the 
petitioner was driving skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Id. Both the 
petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment. Id. At 
the hospital, a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from the 
petitioner. Id. at 758. The results revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in the 
petitioner's blood, which indicated intoxication, and such results were admitted at the 
petitioner's trial. Id. at 759. The petitioner objected to the admission of the results, 
arguing that his blood was drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test. Id. 
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The Schmerber Court found no Fourth Amendment violation stemming from the 
warrantless taking of the petitioner's blood under the unique facts of the case. 
Specifically, the Court relied on the destruction of blood evidence as a relevant factor in 
the exigency determination under the following circumstances: the officer investigating 
the accident encountered the defendant at the accident scene; the defendant smelled of 
alcohol; the passenger in defendant's car was injured and taken to the hospital; the 
investigating officer arrived at the hospital where defendant was being treated almost 
two hours after the accident; and finally, the defendant was placed under arrest. The 
Schmerber Court stated: 
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to 
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to 
eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where 
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate 
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and 
secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt 
to secure evidence of blood alcohol content in this case was an 
appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. 
Id. at 771 (emphasis added). 
However, the Court did not establish a per se rule: 
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the 
facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a 
cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution 
does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under 
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In 1989, this Court decided State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368 (1989). The 
Woolery Court first held that the metabolism of alcohol in the blood provided an inherent 
emergency which justified the warrantless search. Id. The Court then turned to the 
question of whether the test results should have been excluded because the officer did 
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not comply with I.C. § 18-8002. Id. at 371. After exploring cases from other 
jurisdictions, this Court concluded, 
The Idaho Legislature has not created a statutory right to refuse to submit 
to an evidentiary test to determine a driver's blood alcohol level. It is 
difficult to believe that the Idaho Legislature would provide an individual 
with the statutory right to prevent the state from obtaining highly relevant 
evidence when a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe 
the individual has committed a crime - whether it would be driving under 
the influence, vehicular manslaughter, sale or controlled substances, or 
murder. If the driver's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures is complied with, the state should not be prevented 
from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol content of the 
driver's blood. 
Id. at 373 (emphasis added). Thus, this holding in Woolery is that, when the search is 
otherwise constitutional, I.C. § 18-8002 does not create a statutory right to revoke 
consent. This Court characterized the issue as follows: "the issue on appeal is whether 
the trial court erred in admitting appel/ant's blood alcohol content test results either 
because the officer requesting such test did not have reasonable grounds to administer 
the test or because appellant was not informed of his rights pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002." 
Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370. 
In 2002, in an appeal from a driver's license suspension, this Court held that, 
"every driver who drives on Idaho roads has impliedly consented to submit to a BAC 
when properly requested by an officer." Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). 
Halen involved only a license suspension as a result of the petitioner's refusal to take a 
BAC test; it was not a criminal case where the defendant sought suppression of the test. 
In fact, it appears that no search was done because, after Halen refused, he "was 
informed that his driver's license was being suspended based upon his refusal to submit 
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to a BAC." fd. at 831. Halen, "never submitted to a BAC test about which to conduct 
discovery." fd. at 835. 
Building on Hafen, in 2007, this Court decided State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 
(2007). In Diaz, the defendant was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol 
and was transported by the arresting officer to a local hospital where his blood was 
drawn. fd. at 302. The defendant did not physically resist either being transported to 
the hospital or the taking of his blood, but orally protested the blood draw. fd. The 
Defendant was ultimately charged with felony DUI based on prior convictions, and he 
sought to suppress his blood test results, arguing that the test was involuntary and not 
justified by exigent circumstances. fd. 
This Court rejected this argument, concluding that the blood draw could be 
justified either by exigent circumstances or consent. fd. The Court reasoned that 
because the defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving 
on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." fd. at 303. Given the 
Court's finding that the forcible blood draw was consensual, the Court went on to 
consider the reasonableness of the blood draw under the Fourth Amendment, in light of 
the totality of the circumstances including: (1) whether the procedure was done in a 
medically acceptable manner; and (2) whether the procedure was done without 
unreasonable force. fd. Finding the blood draw to be reasonable, the Court then 
considered whether I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) permits officers to order involuntary blood 
draws absent offenses such as aggravated DUI or vehicular manslaughter. fd. The 
Court found that the statute provides no protection to drivers, but only to hospital 
professionals, and does nothing more than limit when an officer may request, rather 
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than order, hospital personnel to draw a driver's blood against the driver's will. Id. at 
303-304. 
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a 
DUI investigation, by itself, justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement. 
Missouri v. McNeely 569 U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1558 (2013). In McNeely, the respondent 
was validly stopped and after declining to take a breath test, was arrested and taken to 
a nearby hospital for a blood draw. Id. at 1557-1558. At the hospital, Mr. McNeely 
refused to consent to the blood draw, but the officer ordered the technician to take the 
blood anyway. Id. The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant. Id. 
Mr. McNeely's blood alcohol content ("BAC") measured at .154 percent. Id. McNeely's 
suppression motion was granted and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court's order granting suppression of the BAC results, relying on Schmerber. Id. The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits as to 
whether "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se 
exigency that it suffices on its own to justify and exception to the warrant requirement. .. 
" Id. at 1558. 
The McNeely Court held that it did not: "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be 
drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do that." Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1561. The Court first 
recognized the importance of the privacy interest at stake, holding that "absent an 
emergency, no less [than a warrant] could be required where intrusions in to the human 
body are concerned," and that the importance of a determination by a neutral and 
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detached magistrate before law enforcement is allowed to "invade another's body in 
search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great." Id. at 1558. The Court reiterated 
what was seemingly forgotten by lower courts after Schmerber. to determine whether an 
officer faced an emergency which would justify alleviating the requirement of a warrant, 
the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1559. 
As part of the analysis, the Court observed that the dissipation of alcohol in the 
blood stream is different "in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in 
which the police are truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation." Id. at 1561 (citing 
Rhoaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973)). While BAC evidence from an alleged 
drunk driver naturally dissipates over time, its dissipation is gradual and relatively 
predictable. Id. In addition, there is always a time gap at issue in each case where the 
officer has to transport the suspect to the place where the blood is to be drawn and is 
required to read all of the administrative license suspension warnings to each suspect. 
Id. These delays, in conjunction with advances in technology making it much easier to 
obtain a warrant, make the use of a per se rule unreasonable and violative of the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 1561-1562. The Court concluded, "[w]e hold that in drunk-driving 
investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute 
an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." 
Id. at 1568. McNeely abrogates Woolery's holding that dissipation of alcohol is a per se 
exigency. Id. at 1558, n.2 
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1. Implied Consent Is Not A Valid Exception To The Warrant Requirement In 
This Case 
In this case, the State does not assert that exigent circumstances justified the 
search. Instead, the State asserted that the search as justified by implied consent. 
Specifically, as noted by the district court, the State's argument was, once "an individual 
has received the benefit of the bargain of implied consent [by driving on public 
roadway], the driver may not void consent already given.'" (R., p.124 (citing the State's 
Brief in Opposition To Defendant's Motion to Suppress.) 1 The district court correctly 
disagreed. As the district court noted, the State asserted that, "because the U.S. 
Supreme Court did not address implied consent statutes in McNeely, Diaz and Wheeler 
can exist in harmony with the McNeely decision." (R., p.125.) The district court 
correctly concluded that this logic, "is contradictory to a reasonable interpretation of the 
implied consent statute, and to the recent U.S. Supreme Court McNeely decision." 
(R., p.125i The court agreed that McNeely did not explicitly address implied consent 
statutes, but concluded, 
1 The State notes that the "district court did not make any factual findings on Halseth's 
allegation that he refused the test." (Appellant's Brief, p.1 n.1.) The district court found 
that Mr. Halseth "allegedly" refused, and that "despite" this alleged refusal, his blood 
was drawn. (R., p.121.) The only evidence submitted in the motion to suppress was 
State's Exhibit 3, which is the report of investigation prepared by the Washington State 
Trooper. (See State's Exhibit 3.) In the report, according to the officer, Mr. Halseth 
stated, "you can't take my blood! I refused! How can you just take it without premission 
[sic]?!" (State's Exhibit 3.) The State's own evidence demonstrates that Mr. Halseth 
refused the test; there is no evidence in the record that supports the conclusion that he 
did not. 
2 With regard to this statement by the district court, the State asserts that "the district 
court lacked authority to overrule the interpretation of the implied consent statute by 
Idaho appellate courts and was not at liberty to ignore that binding precedent." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5 n.2.) While the State is correct that the district court cannot 
overrule a higher court, the district court also noted that this interpretation was 
inconsistent with McNeely, and the State has cited to no authority which holds that a 
11 
It would antithetical to interpret the McNeely opInion was permitting 
warrantless blood draws simply because a state has legislation that allows 
such action. Under the State's logic, states could circumvent the McNeely 
decision by simply relying on implied consent statutes. In other words, the 
State's position is that states can bypass the U.S. Supreme Court's 
announcement that, absent exigent circumstances, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that an officer obtain a warrant prior to conducting 
a blood draw by simply arguing implied consent. 
(R., p.125.) There is no error in the district court's conclusion because a per se implied 
consent exception to warrant requirement does not comport with McNeely. 
In McNeely, while addressing an exigent circumstances issue, the Court held that 
the use of a per se rule was unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment. 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-1562. In this case, the State seeks to replace a per se 
exigency exception with a per se implied consent exception. This also violates the 
Fourth Amendment. The McNeely Court specifically stated, U[h]ere and in its own courts 
the State based its case on an insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing 
after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a 
nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect." Id. 
at 1568. Yet, this is exactly the argument the State makes in this case as the State's 
assertion in the district court was that implied consent, by itself, justified the warrantless 
search. (Tr., p.37, Ls.9-13.) The State went so far as to agree that the implied consent 
law Utrump[ed]" any constitutional challenges to a forced blood draw without exigent 
circumstances. (Tr., p.37, Ls.9-13.) 
The McNeely court used a totality of the circumstances analysis because a 
"case-by case assessment of exigency" was the traditional test. Id. at 1561. The 
district court cannot conclude that a decision from the United States Supreme Court 
abrogates a decision of this Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
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traditional test for consent is also a totality of the circumstances test. See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Christofferson, 101 Idaho 
156 (1980). Thus, the proper test for determining consent is the totality of the 
circumstances. The State has the burden of proving that consent was "freely and 
voluntarily" given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543 (1968). "[T]he question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact 
'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of 
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 227. And, "knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into 
account." Id. A blanket holding that implied consent always justifies a warrantless 
search where there is reasonable grounds to believe the defendant has been driving 
under the influence of alcohol relieves the state of this burden, because proving that 
consent has been "implied" does not establish that it was "freely and voluntarily" given. 
And the Supreme Court has clearly stated that consent can be refused, which is not 
taken into consideration with a per se implied consent rule. Id. Idaho's implied consent 
statute cannot reduce or rescind the basic and fundamental protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) 
(state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make 
searches and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within 
the category of statutes "purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, 
which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional 
searches.") 
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The State asserts that the United States Supreme Court has apparently 
endorsed implied consent laws because the McNeely court mentioned that States can 
use them to enforce DUI laws. (Appellant's Brief, p.S.) The State is mistaken. First, 
this section of McNeely did not carry a majority of the court. Second, the Court did not 
even remotely suggest that implied consent could constitute a per se exception to the 
warrant requirement. The Court stated, 
As an initial matter, States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce 
their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have 
adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of 
operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if 
they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving 
offense. See NHTSA Review 173; supra, at 1556 (describing Missouri's 
implied consent law). Such laws impose significant consequences 
when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist's driver's 
license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow 
the motorist's refusal to take a SAC test to be used as evidence 
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See NHTSA 
Review 173-175; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554, 
563-564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that the use of 
such an adverse inference does not violate the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination). 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 (emphasis added). Thus, this section of the opinion seems 
to take the position that States may use the penalties for withdrawing implied consent to 
enforce their DUI laws, not that implied consent is a per se exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
Further, a recent grant of certiorari suggests that the Supreme Court believes 
that McNeely is relevant to the implied consent issue. In Aviles v. State, 385 S.W. 3d 
110 (Ct. App. Tex. 2012), the Court of Appeals of Texas held that, despite the fact that 
the defendant refused testing, because the warrantless blood draw was conducted in 
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accordance with Texas's implied consent law, there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation. Id. at 115. 
The defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Aviles v. 
Texas, 2014 WL 102362 (Jan. 13, 2014). The Supreme Court order states the 
following: "the motion for petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition 
for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded 
to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, for further consideration in light of 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _ (2013.)" Thus, far from apparently endorsing implied 
consent laws, the Court is now granting writs of certiorari and vacating judgments that 
rely solely on implied consent. 
Notably, the Supreme Court of Arizona recent issued an opinion in agreement 
with Mr. Halseth's argument. See State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609 (2013). In Butler, the 
defendant, a juvenile, admitted to officers that he had driven to school after smoking 
marijuana. Id. at 611. After being given his warnings pursuant to Arizona's implied 
consent statute, the defendant "agreed verbally and in writing to have his blood drawn." 
Id. The Butler Court held that, "independent of [Arizona's implied consent statute], the 
Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's consent to be voluntary to justify a 
warrantless blood draw. If the arrestee is a juvenile, the youth's age and a parent's 
presence are relevant, though not necessarily determinative, factors that courts should 
consider in assessing whether consent was voluntary under the circumstances." Id. at 
613. 
The court then conducted a totality of the circumstances analysis, stating, 
Although Tyler did not testify at the suppression hearing, sufficient 
evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that he did not voluntarily 
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consent to the blood draw. At the time, Tyler was nearly seventeen and in 
eleventh grade. He had been arrested once previously, but not 
adjudicated delinquent. Tyler was detained for about two hours in a school 
room in the presence of school officials and a deputy. Neither of his 
parents was present. Tyler initially was shaking and visibly nervous. When 
he became loud and upset after being told he was being arrested, the 
deputy placed him in handcuffs until he calmed down. A second deputy 
sheriff arrived before the blood draw was taken. After removing the 
handcuffs, the first deputy read the implied consent admonition to Tyler, 
once verbatim and once in what the deputy termed "plain English," 
concluding with the statement, "You are, therefore, required to submit to 
the specified tests." Tyler then assented to the blood draw. 
Id. at 613-14. The court thus concluded that, despite the implied consent statute and 
the fact that the defendant assented to the draw, there was no abuse of discretion by 
the juvenile court in its determination that the defendant's consent was involuntary. Id. 
In sum, because McNeely rejects per se rules in favor of a totality of the 
circumstances test, the district court was correct in its conclusion that the blood draw in 
this case violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The State has not shown, either in the district court or on appeal, that under the totality 
of the circumstances Mr. Halseth freely and voluntarily consented to the blood draw. In 
fact, the record shows the opposite. The decision of the district court should be affirmed 
on this basis. 
2. Diaz And Any Other Case that Holds that Implied Consent By Itself 
Justifies A Blood Draw Should Be Overruled 
Mr. Halseth asserts that, even if this Court concludes that McNeely does not 
abrogate Diaz, Diaz and any other case that holds that Idaho motorists have impliedly 
consented to involuntary blood draws if law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that 
the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicating substance should be overruled. It 
is well recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis need not be strictly adhered to if the 
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precedent in question is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, 
or if overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice. State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) 
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 
(1990». Mr. Halseth asserts that Diaz was manifestly wrong and should be overruled. 
According to Diaz, by obtaining a driver's license, Idaho motorists have impliedly 
consented to involuntary blood draws if law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that 
the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicating substance. To the extent Diaz 
holds that Idaho's implied consent statute creates a per se rule that suffices on its own 
as an exception to the warrant requirement, it cannot comport with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
As is set forth above, the Fourth Amendment requires consent to be 
demonstrated by the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Christofferson, 101 Idaho 156 (1980). The State has the 
burden of proving that consent was "freely and voluntarily" given. Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 222 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). "[T]he question [of] 
whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all 
the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. And, "knowledge of the right to 
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account." Id. Idaho's implied consent 
statute cannot reduce or rescind the basic and fundamental protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) 
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(state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make 
searches and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within 
the category of statutes "purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, 
which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional 
searches. ") 
Further, consent can be withdrawn at any time. See Scheckloth, 412 U.S.at 227, 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 348 (1991) (holding that a suspect may "delimit as he 
chooses the scope of the search to which he consents," in the context of a vehicle 
search); United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, "a 
suspect is free ... after initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her consent 
at any time," in the context of a stop and frisk); United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 
(8th Cir. 2005) ("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United States v. 
Lockett, 406 F.3d 907 (3rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the right to 
revoke his consent in the context of a luggage search); United States v. Marshall, 348 
F.3d 281 (1 st Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United States v. 
Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (10th Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a vehicle 
search); United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1993) (same, in the context 
of a luggage search). Mr. Halseth submits that irrevocable implied consent cannot exist 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
By holding that I.C. § 18-8002 provides for consent, by itself, this Court has 
abandoned the totality of the circumstances test required by Schneckloth. And, based 
upon the fact that this Court noted that the defendant in Diaz refused the testing, this 
Court appears to hold that implied consent cannot be withdrawn. These conclusions 
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are manifestly wrong in light of clear United States Supreme Court precedent regarding 
the State's burden to prove consent. Thus, Diaz must be overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Halseth requests that this Court affirm the district court's order granting 
Mr. Halseth's motion to suppress. 
DATED this ih day of February, 2014. 
JU~TIN M. yURTIS 
Deputy.Stffie Appellate Public Defender 
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